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THE BANKRUPTCY SHADOW: SECTION 525(B) AND THE
JOB APPLICANT’S SISYPHEAN STRUGGLE FOR A FRESH
START
ABSTRACT
Congress amended § 525 of the Bankruptcy Code in 1984 to expand
employment discrimination regulation to private employers. Section 525
prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of bankruptcy status. Section
525(a) prohibits this practice by government employers, and § 525(b) does so
with respect to private employers. But there is a key difference between the
two sections: only § 525(a), which governs public employers, explicitly
prohibits discriminatory hiring on the basis of bankruptcy status.
Courts have split over whether a similar prohibition protecting private
employees from discriminatory hiring should be read into § 525(b). This
Comment argues that by narrowly interpreting § 525(b) as omitting such a
prohibition, courts are dishonoring an overarching goal of bankruptcy law: to
provide debtors with a fresh start. This Comment supports its position in
several ways. First, credit reports—the source of information about
individuals’ bankruptcy status—are unreliable, unfair, and difficult to remedy.
Second, the history of § 525(b) shows that permitting private employers to use
bankruptcy status as a hiring criterion leads to unreasonable and unnecessarily
punitive results that were outside the goals of the enacting legislators. Third,
enacted state statutes and proposed federal legislation identify, address, and
attempt to remedy this very problem.
Ultimately, because bankrupt debtors deserve both a fresh start and
protection against discriminatory hiring, § 525(b) should be amended to
prohibit private employers from hiring discrimination on the basis of
bankruptcy status.
INTRODUCTION
One of the pillars of bankruptcy is providing the debtor with “a fresh start
in life,”1 a “new opportunity,”2 and “a clear field for future effort.”3
1
2

Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918).
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Problematically, employers who request credit reports as part of the job
application process are increasingly disrupting this “fresh start.” When credit
reports reveal job applicants’ past bankruptcies, employers often disqualify the
applicants without considering what gave rise to the bankruptcies or the
applicants’ pertinent credentials. This knee-jerk reaction by employers creates
a bankruptcy shadow: job applicants who filed for bankruptcy after falling
victim to a bad economy or other unfortunate circumstances are categorically
prevented from obtaining employment. The bankruptcy shadow makes jobs
harder to find for those who need them the most. Thus, the Bankruptcy Code’s
fresh start is merely theoretical for a wide swath of debtors. Those looking for
their fresh start are forced, like the mythological king Sisyphus, to endure the
interminable and repetitive toil of job application after job application with no
positive result.
This toil is exemplified by Eric Myers, a North Carolina native, who filed
for chapter 7 bankruptcy relief in 2008.4 A month after Myers filed for
bankruptcy, he moved from North Carolina to Florida in pursuit of a “fresh
start.”5 In Florida, Myers managed to find work at a Starbucks coffeehouse as a
shift supervisor.6 The bankruptcy court discharged Myers’ debt.7 While
working at Starbucks, Myers saw an advertisement for a management position
at a nearby TooJay’s restaurant.8 Myers met with the regional manager of
TooJay’s, and after a two-day on-the-job assessment he was scheduled to begin
working at TooJay’s.9 Myers gave Starbucks his two weeks’ notice.10
However, Myers was never informed that a pristine credit history would be a
prerequisite to gain full-time employment with TooJay’s.11
A month later, before Myers was scheduled to start work, he received a
letter from TooJay’s indicating that his employment offer had been rescinded
due to information revealed in his consumer credit report.12 Myers contacted
TooJay’s Human Resources Department to obtain further explanation about

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904).
Myers v. TooJay’s Mgmt. Corp., 640 F.3d 1278, 1280 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1280–81.
Id. at 1281.
Id.
Id. at 1282.
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why his offer was rescinded.13 TooJay’s explained that its policy forbids hiring
individuals who have filed for bankruptcy.14 In short, Myers could not get a job
at the restaurant because he had filed for bankruptcy relief in 2008.15 Myers
wrote a letter to the CEO requesting that TooJay’s reconsider its policy.16
Myers never received a response to his letter, but instead returned to Starbucks,
where he was forced to accept reduced hours.17 Myers filed suit against
TooJay’s alleging employment discrimination.18 Because TooJay’s is a private
employer and Myers’ employment never officially began, the Bankruptcy
Code could not provide him with protection or compensation.19
Myers did not realize that his past bankruptcy would trail him like a
shadow. Instead, he put his faith in a promise made by the American consumer
bankruptcy system for a “fresh start.” The underlying purpose of the fresh start
is to encourage recovering and former debtors to participate in the American
economy so that they may have a chance at a prosperous financial future.20 The
concept of a fresh start is omnipresent in the world of bankruptcy, yet the
meaning of the term is not fully understood.21 Because “fresh start” has such
an elusive meaning, it is often supplemented with the rhetoric of rehabilitation
by commentators.22
Rehabilitation, in its most distilled form, means that the debtor will be “free
of financial hardship” after she files for bankruptcy.23 Professor Margaret
Howard explained that within the concept of rehabilitation there is a policy
thread of economic rehabilitation.24 However, post-bankruptcy economic
rehabilitation may be impossible when private employers use adverse credit
reports to disqualify job applicants.25 Adverse credit reports are treated like a

13

Id.
Id. at 1281–82.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 1282.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 1280, 1282.
19 See 11 U.S.C. § 525(b) (2006).
20 Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV.
67, 68–69 (2006).
21 Id. at 68.
22 See, e.g., id.
23 Id.
24 Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047, 1060–62
(1987).
25 Id. Credit reports are not the only way to discover whether a job applicant has filed for bankruptcy, it
is just the most prevalent. An employer can also look at the Federal District record system where the job
14
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scarlet letter for those who hoped the bankruptcy system would provide them
with a “fresh start.”26 The bankruptcy system gave Myers the impression that,
if he qualified for and complied with the chapter 7 provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code, he would have a clean slate and the opportunity to better his
circumstances.27 Instead, he is burdened by the shadow of his former
bankruptcy filing.
In Part I, this Comment examines protective mechanisms in the Bankruptcy
Code and the Fair Credit Reporting Act for bankrupt debtors. This Comment
demonstrates that these mechanisms do not adequately prevent employment
discrimination in the bankruptcy context. In Part II, this Comment examines
the majority of courts’ narrow interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 525(b). In Part II,
this Comment also describes an extreme minority of courts that have tried to
skirt the plain meaning of the text to harmonize its interpretation with the fresh
start theory of bankruptcy. In Part III, this Comment argues that reform is
needed because employers’ use of credit checks leads to unfair and
unnecessarily punitive results. In Part IV, this Comment explores both
proposed and enacted state and federal legislation that aims to remedy
employment discrimination in this context. This Comment concludes by
arguing that the Bankruptcy Code should be amended to better protect job
applicants who have filed for bankruptcy.
I. BACKGROUND
To gain context, it is important to first examine § 525(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). These two laws attempt to
limit employment discrimination against debtors. They are the primary statutes
used by courts to determine whether Congress permitted employment
discrimination against bankrupt debtors. First, this Comment addresses
§ 525(b). This Comment reviews the circumstances prompting the enactment
of the statute, surveys the discrepancies in the interpretation of § 525(b), and
outlines the reasons why the majority interpretation provides inadequate
protection. Second, this Comment assesses the FCRA’s deficiency in limiting
the abuse of credit reports in the employment context. A critical examination

applicant resides. The record system is called PACER and is available to the public. See generally PUBLIC
ACCESS TO COURT ELECTRONIC RECORDS, http://www.pacer.gov (last visited Mar. 28, 2013).
26 Michael R. Herz, The Scarlet D: Bankruptcy Filing and Employment Discrimination, 30 AM. BANKR.
INST. L.J., Apr. 2011, at 16, 89–90.
27 See Myers v. TooJay’s Mgmt. Corp., 640 F.3d 1278, 1280 (11th Cir. 2011).
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of § 525(b) and the FCRA supports the argument that to give all debtors a
“fresh start,” Congress must amend § 525(b).
A. Section 525(b) of the Bankruptcy Code
In contrast to § 525(a), which applies to government employers, § 525(b) is
directed at private employers.28 Section 525 of the Bankruptcy Code is the
primary statute that protects bankrupt debtors from employment
discrimination.29 Subsection (b) prevents private employers from terminating
employees based on bankruptcy status.30 However, unlike § 525(a), § 525(b)
does not specify that a private employer cannot “deny employment to” a job
applicant because she was once a bankrupt debtor.31 The two sections’
disparate language has generated a split in the courts as to whether private
employers can deny employment to job applicants solely because their credit
histories reveal a past bankruptcy.32 Below, this Comment discusses the history
preceding the enactment of § 525(b) to demonstrate that the majority
interpretation does not satisfy Congress’s goals.
1. History of 11 U.S.C. § 525
In 1978, Congress enacted § 525 of the Bankruptcy Code in reaction to the
Supreme Court’s Perez v. Campbell decision.33 In Perez, the Court was
dissatisfied with the protection afforded to a debtor who filed for bankruptcy.34
Specifically, in its opinion, the Court expressed that it disliked how a third
party’s action could interfere with a debtor benefiting from the bankruptcy
process.35 In the years following the enactment of § 525, courts filled in the
statutory gaps and manipulated the statute,36 but stopped short of applying it to
28

Compare 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (2006), with id. § 525(b).
Id. § 525(b).
30 Id.
31 Compare id. § 525(a), with id. § 525(b).
32 See, e.g., Rea v. Federated Investors, 627 F.3d 937, 940 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 116
(2011); Leary v. Warnaco, Inc., 251 B.R. 656, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
33 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 81 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5867 (citing Perez v.
Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (holding that a state would frustrate the congressional policy of a fresh start if
it were permitted to refuse to renew a drivers license because the driver did not pay a judgment that was
discharged in bankruptcy)); David L. Zeiler, Section 525(b): Anti-Discrimination Protection for
Employees/Debtors in the Private Sector—Is it Illusion or Reality?, 101 COM. L.J. 152, 152 & n.2 (1996).
34 See Perez, 402 U.S. at 654.
35 See id.
36 See Zeiler, supra note 33, at 157 (“Conduct [the courts] deemed to warrant debtor protection includes:
withholding college transcripts by public institutions, excluding bankrupt debtors from student loan guarantee
programs, refusing participation in the contract bidding process by governmental entities, refusing to grant
29
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debtors who suffer discrimination at the hands of private employers.37 Courts
have explained that the language of § 525 prevents them from interpreting the
statute in a way that punishes private employers’ discriminatory hiring.38 For
instance, in one case, the Eleventh Circuit did not condone private entities’
discriminatory actions, but explained that it would be improper to replace the
court’s policy opinions with the legislation passed by Congress.39
Congress responded to the courts’ disapproval of the limitations of § 525
by amending the statute in 1984. The original provision states:
[A] governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to
renew a license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant to,
conditions such a grant to, discriminate with respect to such a grant
against, deny employment to, terminate the employment of, or
discriminate with respect to employment against, a person that is or
has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or a debtor under the
Bankruptcy Act, or another person with whom such bankrupt or
debtor has been associated, solely because such bankrupt or debtor is
or has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or debtor under the
Bankruptcy Act, has been insolvent before the commencement of the
case under this title, or during the case but before the debtor is
granted or denied a discharge, or has not paid a debt that is
dischargeable in the case under this title or that was discharged under
40
the Bankruptcy Act.

This amendment numbered the original provision from the 1978 Bankruptcy
Reform Act as subsection (a) and the new provision as subsection (b).
Subsection (b) provides:
No private employer may terminate the employment of, or
discriminate with respect to employment against, an individual who
is or has been a debtor under this title, a debtor or bankrupt under the

state licensure, evicting a discharged debtor from municipal housing, and participating in governmental home
mortgage finance programs.”).
37 Id.
38 See Burnett v. Stewart Title, Inc. (In re Burnett), 635 F.3d 169, 173 (5th Cir. 2011); Myers v. TooJay’s
Mgmt. Corp., 419 B.R. 51, 58 (M.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d, 640 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2011); Stinson v. BB&T Inv.
Servs., Inc. (In re Stinson), 285 B.R. 239, 248 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2002); see also Kungys v. United States, 485
U.S. 759, 778 (1988) (“[T]he cardinal rule of statutory interpretation [is] that no provision should be construed
to be entirely redundant.”).
39 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (2006); Myers v. TooJay’s Mgmt. Corp., 640 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 52 (2008)); see, e.g., Barbee v. First
Va. Bank-Colonial (In re Barbee), 14 B.R. 733, 736 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981).
40 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (emphasis added).
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Bankruptcy Act, or an individual associated with such debtor or
bankrupt, solely because such debtor or bankrupt—
(1) is or has been a debtor under this title or a debtor or
bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act;
(2) has been insolvent before the commencement of a case
under this title or during the case but before the grant or denial
of a discharge; or
(3) has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in a case under this
41
title or that was discharged under the Bankruptcy Act.

Section 525(b) essentially prevents private employers from discriminating
against debtors who filed for bankruptcy if certain conditions are met.
When Congress enacted § 525(b), legal scholars lauded it as a
strengthening of existing bankruptcy policies.42 They explained that extending
the protection afforded against government employers to private employers
would promote rehabilitation and provide a fresh start for debtors.43 While
these scholars recognized that interpreting courts would inevitably shape the
new law, one bankruptcy attorney confidently wrote in the American
Bankruptcy Law Journal that § 525(b) “does protect an employee from
terminations or other actions, the effect of which would interfere with the
‘fresh start’ policy of the bankruptcy laws.”44 This understanding of § 525(b)
would turn out to be overly optimistic because courts would interpret this new
provision to provide limited protection to the “honest but unfortunate
debtor.”45
2. Judicial Interpretation of § 525(b)
Courts are split on how to interpret § 525(b) in light of § 525(a), which
does not allow a government employer to deny employment to an applicant
who has filed for bankruptcy.46 Most courts that have considered § 525(b) have
decided that the statute does not bar a private employer from discriminating
against applicants who have filed for bankruptcy, while a minority of courts
41

Id.
Zeiler, supra note 33, at 153; see also Douglas G. Boshkoff, Private Parties and Bankruptcy-Based
Discrimination, 62 IND. L.J. 159 (1987); John C. Chobot, Anti-Discrimination Under the Bankruptcy Laws, 60
AM. BANKR. L.J. 185 (1986); Andrew N. Herbach, Debtor’s Protection from Private Employer’s
Discrimination, WIS. B. BULL., Oct. 1988, at 21.
43 See, e.g., Zeiler, supra note 33, at 153; Boshkoff, supra note 42; Chobot, supra note 42; Herbach,
supra note 42.
44 Chobot, supra note 42, at 201.
45 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
46 Herz, supra note 26, at 18.
42
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have decided that the statute should be interpreted to protect private job
applicants.47 Because § 525(b)’s language does not explicitly prevent a private
employer from denying employment to an individual who has filed for
bankruptcy, courts must speculate as to whether subsection (b) protects job
applicants.48 Courts are left to deduce whether § 525(b)’s omission of “deny
employment to” was a scrivener’s error or evidence that Congress intended for
private employers to be subjected to less stringent standards than government
employers.49 Unfortunately, the legislative history is vague and confusing.50
B. Fair Credit Reporting Act
The FCRA is another law that ineffectively limits employment
discrimination. Congress enacted the FCRA to curtail abusive practices by
credit-reporting agencies and those who subscribe to these the reports.51 The
primary function of these agencies is to produce consumer credit reports for
third-party lenders that reflect individuals’ creditworthiness.52 There are three
main credit-reporting agencies in the United States: Experian, Equifax, and
TransUnion.53 These credit-reporting agencies must comply with the FCRA.
The FCRA has been criticized for not shielding consumers from employers
who use these reports to punish job applicants who have filed for bankruptcy.54
Credit reports are widely used by employers because they believe that job
applicants with fewer payment delinquencies and better credit scores are less
likely to steal and more likely to be valuable workers.55 Below, this Comment

47

See infra Part II.
Leary v. Warnaco, Inc., 251 B.R. 656, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“We are asked to infer from this omission
not only that it was purposeful to achieve a disparate result where the Government is the employer, but that
§ 525(b) accordingly allows employers to discriminate on the initial hiring against those unfortunate economic
casualties who are seeking or have obtained a fresh start from the bankruptcy court, and yet at the same time
prohibits discrimination against those who have been hired.”).
49 See Rea v. Federated Investors, 627 F.3d 937, 940 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing the Leary court’s opinion
that § 525(b) contains a scrivener’s error and ultimately rejecting this interpretation), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
116 (2011).
50 See generally H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 367 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6322–23.
51 Kelly Gallagher, Comment, Rethinking the Fair Credit Reporting Act: When Requesting Credit
Reports for “Employment Purposes” Goes Too Far, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1593, 1595 (2006).
52 Experian (formerly TRW), Equifax, and TransUnion dominate the multibillion-dollar credit industry
where they have reports on almost every single adult American and add over 24 billion pieces of information
to their reports each year. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS
13 (6th ed. 2009).
53 Id.
54 Gallagher, supra note 51, at 1595.
55 Id.
48
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will explore the effect of the FCRA on credit reporting agencies and
employers.
1. Credit Reporting Agency Abuse of Credit Reports
A credit score is designed to be a snapshot of an individual’s current
financial health.56 The FCRA defines consumer credit reports as
any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a
consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit
worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general
reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used
or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose
of serving as a factor in establishing a consumer’s eligibility for – (A)
credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes; (B) employment purposes; or (C) any other
57
purpose authorized under section 1681b of this title.

Simply put, a credit report is any type of statement created by a consumerreporting agency that has been used to determine a consumer’s eligibility for
credit, insurance, or a job. The FCRA mandates that credit reporting agencies
use “reasonable procedures” to guarantee the accuracy of the information
found within a credit report. The majority of courts subscribe to the “maximum
possible accuracy” standard, which holds credit reporting agencies liable for
“reports containing factually incorrect information that . . . mislead their
readers.”58 But, there are many courts that only require that credit reports be
“technically accurate.”59 This less stringent standard allows for credit reporting
agencies to report information that may be misleading or deficient.60 For
example, if a father files for bankruptcy after co-signing a car lease with his
daughter, it is “technically accurate” to include the bankruptcy on her credit
report.61 This is misleading because the daughter’s credit report will indicate
that she filed for bankruptcy when, in actuality, it was her father who filed for
bankruptcy.
56 The score range used by the three main credit-reporting agencies is from a bad score of 300 to a
perfect score of 850, and it reflects the types of credit in use, payment history, amount owed, length of credit
history, and new credit. FAIR ISAAC CORP., UNDERSTANDING YOUR FICO SCORE 3 (2011), http://www.myfico.
com/Downloads/Files/myFICO_UYFS_Booklet.pdf.
57 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2006).
58 Neal v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., No. 8:02CV378, 2004 WL 628214, at *3 (D. Neb. Mar. 30, 2004).
59 Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 283 (7th Cir. 1994); Neal, 2004 WL 628214, at *3; Todd v.
Associated Credit Bureau Servs., Inc. 451 F. Supp. 447, 448 (E.D. Pa.1977).
60 Neal, 2004 WL 628214, at *3.
61 See, e.g., id. at *3–4.
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Despite most courts’ expectations that credit reporting agencies maintain
“maximum possible accuracy,” a 2004 study by the Public Interest Research
Group found that seventy-nine percent of credit reports contained errors.62 This
statistic raises the question of whether credit reports should be used as a
barometer of job success and whether the FCRA is effective in protecting
consumers. Moreover, the statistic also demonstrates job applicants’
vulnerability, as the broad language of the FCRA allows for nearly unrestricted
use of consumer credit reports for “employment purposes.”63 Employers are
unrestricted in their use of inaccurate credit reports to deny individuals
employment.64 This unfettered power is inherently unfair because it not only
denies bankrupt debtors a “fresh start,” but it also punishes applicants who are
not bankrupt debtors but who are listed as such on their credit reports.
2. Employer Abuse of Credit Reports
Employers that wish to obtain a job applicant’s credit report must procure
written authorization from the applicant.65 If an employer takes adverse action
against an applicant because of information in her credit report, the FCRA
requires two additional transparency measures.66 First, the employer must
furnish the applicant with a copy of her credit report.67 Second, the employer
must inform the applicant that information found in her credit report was
detrimental to her application.68 This second measure is important because, in
theory, it gives an individual the information she needs to be proactive in
remedying any inaccuracies in her credit report. This Comment will address
why this unfortunately does not work in practice.69
The credit report that an employer receives includes bankruptcy records.70
This information may be a factor in employers’ decisions to employ the
applicant. Employers feel justified to use credit reports as an evaluative tool

62

WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 52, at 13.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(B) (2006).
64 See EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., 790 F. Supp. 2d 619, 624 (N.D. Ohio 2011).
65 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii).
66 Id. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i)–(ii).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 See infra Part III.A.1.b.
70 Credit Reports and Credit Scores, FEDERALRESERVE.GOV (Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.federalreserve.
gov/creditreports/default.htm.
63
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because they believe credit reflects a potential job candidate’s qualifications.71
Sixty percent of employers use credit checks in pre-employment screenings for
at least some job applicants.72 Yet, there are no studies supporting a correlation
between a person’s credit and her job performance.73 In fact, a TransUnion
Credit Bureau official stated under oath that there is no “research to show any
statistical correlation between what’s in somebody’s credit report and their job
performance or their likelihood to commit fraud.”74 If credit reporting agencies
cannot provide empirical support to justify employer reliance on their product,
employers should be prohibited from using them to make hiring decisions.
In Part II, this Comment will address how courts have interpreted § 525(b).
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF § 525(B)
Courts are currently split on how to interpret § 525(b) in light of § 525(a).
According to a majority of courts, a plain reading of § 525(b) reveals
Congress’s purposeful omission of the expansive protection afforded to private
job applicants under § 525(a).75 These courts hold that subsection (b) should be
interpreted as not affording private job applicants the same anti-discriminatory
rights as individuals who are applying for government jobs.76 For example,
under the majority interpretation, an individual who filed for chapter 7
bankruptcy five years prior to applying for a job cannot be discriminated
against solely for that reason if he is applying for a position with the post
office, but he can be discriminated against if he is applying for a job with
FedEx or UPS.77
A minority of courts takes the position that the language of § 525(b) is
broad enough to extend protections to discriminatory hiring by private
employers.78 These courts believe that they “should not go out of [their] way to
place such an absurd gloss on a remedial statute, simply because the scrivener
71 See Background Checking: Conducting Credit Background Checks SHRM Poll, SOCIETY FOR HUMAN
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings/Articles/Pages/
BackgroundChecking.aspx.
72 Id.
73 See Andrew Martin, As a Hiring Filter Credit Checks Draw Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2010
(quoting Eric Rosenberg of TransUnion Credit Bureau).
74 See id.
75 See, e.g., Rea v. Federated Investors, 627 F.3d 937, 940 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 116
(2011).
76 See id. at 940–41.
77 See 11 U.S.C. § 525(a)–(b) (2006).
78 See Leary v. Warnaco, Inc., 251 B.R. 656, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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was more verbose in writing § 525(a).”79 Instead, the minority view claims that
subsection (a)’s inclusion of “discriminate with respect to employment against
an individual who . . . has been a debtor” is broad enough to encompass
employment discrimination in the private employer context.80 The majority of
courts maintain that this language is not explicit enough to have such a broad
meaning.81 In response, the minority view claims that the evil being legislated
against is the same whether an individual is being discriminated against during
her employment with a private entity or discriminated against during the hiring
process.82 For example, an individual who works for FedEx or UPS cannot be
fired because his employer discovers that he filed for bankruptcy, but he can be
removed from the applicant pool because of this filing.83 Such arbitrary
distinctions make little sense and will be discussed below. This Comment will
look to how courts of appeals have decided § 525(b) cases, and then address a
minority court that has interpreted the statute differently.
A. Majority View and the Courts of Appeals’ Consensus
In 2010, the Third Circuit adopted the majority’s position in Rea v.
Federated Investors.84 In 2011, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits followed suit.85
These are the only courts of appeals that have addressed the scope of § 525(b).
Thus, all of the circuit courts that have interpreted § 525(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code have concluded that the statute does not preclude private employers from
engaging in discriminatory hiring.86 There are two main reasons why this
conclusion is appealing: (1) it purports to discern the plain meaning of the
statute; and (2) when the two subsections of the statute are read in pari
materia, through a direct comparison, a court’s more narrow interpretation is
easily defensible. Each of these points will be explained in turn.

79

Id.
Id.
81 11 U.S.C. § 525(b).
82 Leary, 251 B.R. at 658.
83 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 525(b).
84 Rea v. Federated Investors, 627 F.3d 937, 938 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 116 (2011).
85 See Myers v. TooJay’s Mgmt. Corp., 640 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2011); Burnett v. Stewart Title, Inc. (In
re Burnett), 635 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2011).
86 See, e.g., Myers, 640 F.3d at 1278; In re Burnett, 635 F.3d at 169; Rea, 627 F.3d at 937; Stinson v.
BB&T Inv. Servs., Inc. (In re Stinson), 285 B.R. 239 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2002); Fiorani v. CACI, 192 B.R. 401
(E.D. Va. 1996); Pastore v. Medford Sav. Bank, 186 B.R. 553 (D. Mass. 1995); Madison Madison Int’l of Ill.,
P.C. v. Matra, S.A. (In re Madison Int’l of Ill., P.C.), 77 B.R. 678 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987). Contra In re
Hopkins, 81 B.R. 491 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1987).
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1. “Plain Meaning” Interpretation
The Supreme Court frequently endorses a “plain meaning” interpretation of
a statute because the words used in a particular statute are the most persuasive
evidence of the legislature’s intent.87 The Third Circuit’s opinion in Rea v.
Federated Investors is illustrative of the majority’s plain meaning
interpretation of § 525(b). The Third Circuit held that the phrase
“discrimination with respect to employment” should not be read broadly to
encompass hiring.88 The facts in Rea are typical of hiring discrimination cases
arising under § 525(b). In Rea, Dean Rea filed for bankruptcy and his debts
were discharged.89 Six years later, he applied for a project manager job with
Federated Investors, but the offer was contingent on a check of his credit
history.90 Rea authorized the checks, and it revealed his past bankruptcy.91 The
bankruptcy was a “deal killer”; the job offer was withdrawn.92
Rea then sued, claiming that the employer had engaged in unlawful
employment discrimination when the firm refused to hire him because of his
past bankruptcy.93 The employer moved to dismiss Rea’s action and argued
that § 525(b) is not applicable to situations in which private employers refuse
to hire an individual because that individual has filed for bankruptcy.94 The
employer claimed that the plain meaning of § 525(b) did not specifically
include “hiring” in its list of actions that should be considered employment
discrimination against a bankrupt debtor.95
However, the text of § 525(b) does not explicitly exclude “hiring.”96
Arguably, Congress meant for the phrase “[n]o private employer . . . may

87

United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940).
11 U.S.C. § 525(b) (2006); Rea, 627 F.3d at 940–41. Lower courts have similarly held that the phrase
“discriminate with respect to employment” should not be a catchall phrase calculated to encompass all
particulars of employment. Burnett v. Stewart Title, Inc. (In re Burnett), 431 B.R. 894, 899–900 (S.D. Tex.
2010), aff’d, 635 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2011).
89 Rea, 627 F.3d at 938.
90 Rea v. Federated Investors, 431 B.R. 18, 20 (W.D. Pa. 2010), aff’d, 627 F.3d 937 (3d Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 116 (2011).
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 See 11 U.S.C. § 525(b); Linda Coady, Private Employer May Refuse to Hire Bankrupt Applicant,
THOMPSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (Jan. 23, 2013, 4:55 PM), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/
Bankruptcy/Insight/2011/01_-_January/Private_employer_may_refuse_to_hire_bankrupt_applicant/.
94 Rea, 627 F.3d at 939 (emphasis added).
95 Id.
96 See 11 U.S.C. § 525(b).
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discriminate with respect to employment” to include discriminatory hiring.97
This, too, would be a reasonable plain meaning interpretation of the statute’s
text. The minority disputes that the plain meaning interpretation of § 525(b)
supports the exclusion of hiring discrimination by private employers.98
The minority argues that the language “with respect to employment” is
broad enough to encompass discrimination in hiring.99 In Leary v. Warnaco,
the Southern District Court of New York reasoned that discrimination “with
respect to employment” embraces, through its plain meaning, all facets of
employment including “hiring, firing and material changes in job
conditions.”100 Commentators posit that any interpretation of a statute that
strictly looks at its plain meaning risks generating a “law without mind.”101
Instead, some courts, as discussed below, try to read a statute in within the
context of similar statutes to move beyond a purely plain meaning approach.
2. In Pari Materia
The majority counters that interpreting the phrase “with respect to
employment” to include hiring would make the provisions in § 525(a) and (b)
redundant and much of the specific language in subsection (a) superfluous.102
The majority reasons that disparate inclusions and exclusions within two
subsections should be read in pari materia if the scope and aim of the
subsections are the same.103 In pari materia is a statutory canon driving the
legal fiction that where “Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a
prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the
interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the
new statute.”104 In short, without evidence to the contrary, judges are to assume
that Congress was aware of all other relevant statutes when it was drafting a
new statute. When interpreting a statute,
97

Id.; see also Stinson v. BB&T Inv. Servs., Inc. (In re Stinson), 285 B.R. 239, 245 (Bankr. W.D. Va.

2002).
98

Leary v. Warnaco, Inc., 251 B.R. 656, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 525(b); Leary, 251 B.R. at 658.
100 11 U.S.C. § 525(b); Leary, 251 B.R. at 659.
101 See generally Steven Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104 (1989).
102 11 U.S.C. § 525(a)–(b); Burnett v. Stewart Title, Inc. (In re Burnett), 635 F.3d 169, 172–73 (5th Cir.
2011); Myers v. TooJay’s Mgmt. Corp., 419 B.R. 51, 58 (M.D. Fla. 2009); Stinson, 285 B.R. at 248; see
Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 777–78 (1988) (noting that “the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation
that no provision should be construed to be entirely redundant”).
103 See United States v. Mitchell, 39 F.3d 465, 468 (4th Cir. 1994).
104 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 292 (2d ed. 2006)
(citing Lorillard v. Pons, 433 U.S. 907 (1977)).
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the court will not look merely to a particular clause in which general
words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole
statute . . . and the objects and policy of the law, as indicated by its
various provisions, and give to it such a construction as will carry
105
into execution the will of the Legislature.

Simply put, if there is more than one subsection within a statute, then the two
will be read side-by-side to fully understand Congress’s intent. If § 525(a) and
(b) are read in pari materia, the majority of courts construe Congress’s use of
the same wording in both subsections of the statute with an absence of “deny
employment to” in subsection (b) as a purposeful omission on the part of
Congress.106
The employer argued in Rea for a narrow reading of § 525(b), noting
“where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposefully in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion.”107 The majority emphasized that Congress made the language in
subsection (b) nearly identical to subsection (a) and put the two subsections
adjacent to each other.108 The Third Circuit concluded that Congress must have
modeled subsection (b) after subsection (a), and so exclusion of language in
subsection (b) dealing with hiring was ipso facto deliberate.109 The majority
also conceded that, if § 525(b) existed in isolation, the implicit inclusion of
hiring in its list of discriminatory acts would be meritorious.110
The majority’s position emphasizes that the plain meaning interpretation of
§ 525(b) does not prohibit discriminating hiring based on bankruptcy.111 The
Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that § 525(b) should be read in
pari materia.112 Using this statutory canon, the majority argues that Congress
meant to exempt private hiring from § 525’s protections from actions that are
considered discriminatory.113 The minority, on the other hand, argues that it is

105

Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974).
Myers v. TooJay’s Mgmt. Corp., 419 B.R. 51, 57 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
107 Rea v. Federated Investors, 627 F.3d 937, 939 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 116 (2011)
(quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
108 Id. at 940.
109 Id.
110 Burnett v. Stewart Title, Inc. (In re Burnett), 635 F.3d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 2011).
111 See, e.g., Myers, 640 F.3d at 1283–84; In re Burnett, 635 F.3d at 172–73; Rea, 627 F.3d at 938.
112 See, e.g., Myers, 640 F.3d at 1283–84; In re Burnett, 635 F.3d at 172–73; Rea, 627 F.3d at 938.
113 See, e.g., Myers, 640 F.3d at 1283–84; In re Burnett, 635 F.3d at 172–73; Rea, 627 F.3d at 938.
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employment discrimination under § 525(b) to deny employment to an
individual because of a past bankruptcy.114
B. Minority View as Exemplified in the Leary Case
The scope and aims of subsections (a) and (b) are alike: both provisions
protect bankrupt debtors from employment discrimination. It is possible that
the Bankruptcy Code is purposefully extending less protection to individuals
applying for private jobs than government positions. But, the minority argues
that this interpretation does not pass muster when the underlying tenets of
bankruptcy’s fresh start policy are kept in mind.115 Interpreting a statute with
the goal of honoring this policy would make the plain meaning just one factor
in determining the legislative intent behind § 525(b).116
Section 525(b) does not exist in isolation. It makes sense to consider all
relevant material when interpreting its provisions. The majority, taking its
plain meaning stance, comments that Congress’s intentions are instructive for
interpreting § 525(b).117 In the applicable Senate Report, Congress instructed
that courts “will continue to mark the contours of the anti-discrimination
provision in pursuit of sound bankruptcy policy.”118 There is no such
legislative history for § 525(b), but using the majority’s logic that Congress
paints with a wide brush, this intention should imbue subsection (b) as well.
When drafting § 525, Congress was mindful of the tenets of bankruptcy.119
Perhaps courts should adopt this frame of reference of rehabilitation and a
fresh start when interpreting statutes from the Bankruptcy Code.
The bankruptcy court case of Leary v. Warnaco, Inc.120 is the sole case
representing the minority’s position. Marlene Leary filed and received a
voluntary discharge under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.121 About five
months later Leary interviewed for an executive assistant position.122 The
employer offered Leary the job subject to a credit check.123 When Leary’s
114

Leary v. Warnaco, Inc., 251 B.R. 656, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Id.
116 Eskridge and his coauthors warn that “if the rule of law requires interpreters to apply statutes to the
letter, then sometimes the cost of ‘lawfulness’ will be too great.” ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 104, at 233.
117 Stinson v. BB&T Inv. Servs., Inc. (In re Stinson), 285 B.R. 239, 247 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2002).
118 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 81 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5867.
119 Id.
120 251 B.R. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
121 Id. at 657.
122 Id.
123 Id.
115
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credit report revealed her past bankruptcy, the company told her it would not
hire her due to information found within the report.124 Leary filed a complaint
alleging that by refusing to hire her because of her past bankruptcy, the
employer violated § 525(b).125 Leary argued for a broader interpretation of
§ 525(b) that takes into account the fresh start theory and avoids the absurd
result that would follow from a narrow reading of the statute.126 Here, an
intertextual argument was applied in the Leary case. An intratextual argument
supports the majority’s position. Each will be explained in turn.
1. Intertextual Argument
In general, it is assumed that Congress uses terms in a consistent manner
and with a design that each provision contributes to the overall statutory
scheme. Congress wishes to avoid the situation where a provision is to be
applied in ways that weaken other provisions.127 The theory employed by all
federal and state courts is called the “whole act rule” and the premise is that
Congress enacts legislation as if it did not have a variety of authors, but one
author throughout Congress’s entire lifespan.128 There are two opposing, yet
related, arguments for how to interpret a statute holistically—the intertextual
argument and the intratextual argument. The two arguments are formed under
the one mind, omniscient author premise.
Under the intratextual argument, “the preferred meaning of a provision is
the one consistent with the rest of the statute and statutory scheme.”129 Akin to
an in pari materia argument,130 the majority uses an intratextual argument to
support its position that unaccounted for verbiage should not be injected into
§ 525(b).131 On the other hand, the intertextual argument presupposes that “the

124

Id.
Id.
126 Id. at 658–59.
127 ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 104, at 271. “The assumption of a single-minded and omniscient
legislature is strongly at odds with actual legislative practice, where terms are inserted willy-nilly into the law,
duplication occurs for reasons of emphasis or even just oversight, and compromises may yield provisions that
are in tension with one another.” Id. at 271–72.
128 Id. at 271. Professor William Buzbee calls this assumption the “one-Congress fiction” where
“questionable logic illuminates the weak normative and empirical underpinnings of some broader claims about
textualist modes of interpretation.” William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 242 (2000).
129 ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 104, at 272.
130 See supra Part II.A.2.
131 Myers v. TooJay’s Mgmt. Corp., 419 B.R. 51, 57 (M.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d, 640 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir.
2011).
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preferred meaning of a provision is the one consistent with the rest of the
code.”132 The minority position provides that § 525(b) should be interpreted
even more broadly than the majority suggests.133 Instead of merely juxtaposing
the two subsections of § 525, the statute should be read with the attainment of
a fresh start in mind. This broader interpretation echoes the familiar rule that “a
thing may be within the letter of the statute, and yet not within the statute,
because [it is] not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers.”134
Determining how broadly to interpret a statute from the Bankruptcy Code is
unambiguous according to this interpretation because rehabilitation and a fresh
start are always the goal.135
Interpreting § 525(b) with an emphasis on the policy aims of the
Bankruptcy Code, in lieu of the plain text enacted by Congress, may be a
usurpation of Congress’s legislative role.136 The Fifth Circuit likened this
broader interpretation to looking at a statute with a blurry eye in an attempt to
find a hidden meaning.137 This comparison is less than apt. Examining a statute
without consideration of the Bankruptcy Code as a whole is like looking at a
statute with tunnel vision. It is easier to have a clear view of a statute’s
subsection when the rest of the Code is used as a frame of reference.
Otherwise, reading § 525(b) in a vacuum ignores the evils that the Bankruptcy
Code is trying to resolve. As argued by the minority, a myopic interpretation of
the Bankruptcy Code may result in an absurd judgment.138
2. Absurd Result and Scrivener’s Error
The absurd result canon assumes that Congress does not intend to make
illogical or unclear instructions for courts to interpret.139 Courts should not
have to rewrite a statute to avoid an absurd result.140 An absurd result may be
due to a blunder on the part of the legislature that enacted the statute. The
Supreme Court has called this type of blunder a scrivener’s error.141 If an
132

ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 104, at 272.
The Leary court criticizes the majority position for interpreting § 525(b) too narrowly and “drawing a
negative inference in” by comparing it to subsection (a). Leary v. Warnaco, Inc., 251 B.R. 656, 658 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
134 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
135 See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 81 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5867.
136 Burnett v. Stewart Title, Inc., 431 B.R. 894, 900 (S.D. Tex 2010), aff’d, 635 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2011).
137 See Myers v. TooJay’s Mgmt. Corp., 640 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2011).
138 Leary, 251 B.R. at 658.
139 ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 104, at 267.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 269.
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absurd result is deemed to be a scrivener’s error, then the canon as frequently
applied requires the judiciary to remedy the mistake.142 To detect a scrivener’s
error it is imperative that a statute be interpreted so as to not only look at the
plain meaning of the text, but also to take into account the legislative
deliberation and practical consequences of interpreting the words as they are
written.143
In Leary, the court explained, “[t]he evil being legislated against is no
different when an employer fires a debtor simply for seeking refuge in
bankruptcy, as contrasted with refusing to hire a person who does so. The
‘fresh start’ policy is impaired in either case.”144 Further, “[a] Court should not
go out of its way to place such an absurd gloss on a remedial statute, simply
because the scrivener was more verbose in writing § 525(a).”145 The Leary
court reasoned that it is nonsensical to draw an arbitrary line between public
and private employers where a discriminatory action by one is acceptable but
not the other.146 The Leary court explained the absence of certain phrases that
were included in § 525(a) by saying that the scrivener for § 525(b) was simply
less verbose.147
The Fifth Circuit addressed this inconsistency and dismissed it as a policy
argument best delegated to Congress.148 The majority uses the rationale that
ascribing the difference in the language to a mistake in draftsmanship is
contrary to overwhelming authority.149 The Third Circuit rejected the argument
that the varying language in the two subsections is a scrivener’s error.150 In
Myers v. TooJay’s Management Corporation, the Eleventh Circuit argued that
just because subsection (b) was enacted by Congress seven years after
subsection (a) does not mean that any omissions are errors.151 The Eleventh
Circuit reasoned that Congress’s use of the same language in subsection (b) as
in subsection (a) is evidence that Congress modeled the former on the latter
142

Id.
Id. at 233.
144 Leary v. Warnaco, Inc., 251 B.R. 656, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Burnett v. Stewart Title, Inc. (In re Burnett), 635 F.3d 169, 173 (5th Cir. 2011).
149 Id.
150 Rea v. Federated Investors, 627 F.3d 937, 941 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 116 (2011)
(“[W]e refrain from concluding here that the differing language in the two subsections has the same meaning
in each. We would not presume to ascribe this difference to a simple mistake in draftsmanship.” (quoting
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))).
151 See Myers v. TooJay’s Mgmt. Corp., 640 F.3d 1278, 1284 n.5 (11th Cir. 2011).
143
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and, thus, omission of the phrase “deny employment to” from subsection (b)
was purposeful.152
Here, the majority argues that Congress’s silence on the issue speaks loud
and clear.153 It is hard to fault the majority for its unwillingness to interpret
§ 525(b) beyond what it sees as the plain meaning of the text. Since this view
is pervasive and courts are loath to overstep their constitutional role, it is
necessary for Congress to revisit § 525(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and amend
its language to better advance bankruptcy’s fresh start policy.
III. CREDIT CHECKS AS AN EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE LEAD TO UNREASONABLE
AND PUNITIVE RESULTS
In this Part, this Comment argues that private employers should not use
credit report information to screen applicants because doing so leads to
unreasonable results that are unnecessarily punitive. In particular, there are five
reasons why the use of credit reports is unreasonable and punitive. First, credit
reports are ineffective evaluative tools due to their inaccuracies. Credit reports
are not only unreliable, but their unreliability is difficult to remedy. Second,
credit reports ignore external factors that lead to bankruptcies. Because of
issues such as job problems, illness, and family break-up, otherwise-qualified
job applicants are treated adversely for reasons outside their control when
employers discriminate against them based on credit history. Third, financial
responsibility, the ostensible reason for using credit reports in employment, is
irrelevant to most low-level positions. Fourth, the use of credit reports is
unreasonable because it may violate the Title VII disparate impact doctrine.
Lastly, screening out job applicants who file for bankruptcy is unnecessarily
punitive because it punishes individuals who have already been penalized for
incurring too much debt. Each of these reasons for why credit reports provide
little to no value in the employment context is discussed below.
A. Discrete Yet Harmful Measure154
It is far too easy to obtain a consumer credit report. Consumer credit
reporting agencies disclose an individual’s bankruptcy records to an employer

152

Id. at 1284–85.
Id. at 1285.
154 In this subpart, I define a “discrete yet harmful measure” as a criterion that bears no connection to
what it is used to prove.
153
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if the employer follows the necessary steps to obtain this report.155 While
employers justify using credit reports because they think it is necessary, many
employers use this information regardless of its inherent value because it is an
easy tool to truncate the applicant pool.156 The President of Consumer
Education at Credit.com explained this best when he said “The recession has
made this a buyer’s market when it comes to hiring, which may be leading
more companies to use credit reports as screening criteria.”157
Other employers truly believe gathering this information is a germane
practice for gaining insight into an employee’s value, likelihood to steal, or
money managing skills.158 In testimony to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), an executive member of the National Employment
Lawyers Association, debunked one of the main reasons for using credit
reports as an evaluative tool: “There’s no evidence, no science to suggest that
one’s credit has anything at all to do with propensity to steal.”159 Nonetheless,
the Society of Human Resource Management found that 35% of employers use
credit checks to look into the backgrounds of job applicants.160 This is a
growing practice amongst employers.161
Despite employers’ increased reliance on credit reports, in reality, this
practice is a discrete and harmful measure for four reasons. First, credit records
are laden with inaccuracies that are onerous to correct.162 The information they
impart may not even depict an individual’s actual credit history, let alone her
value as an employee. Second, this practice obfuscates the reasons outside of
155

See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a), (b)(3) (2006).
See Ruth Desmond, Comment, Consumer Credit Reports and Privacy in the Employment Context: The
Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Equal Employment for All Act, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 907, 907–08 (2010).
157 Pamela Yip, Employers Increasingly Use Applicants’ Credit Histories In Determining Job Future,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 21 2009, available at Newspaper Source Accession No. 2W6253277812.
158 Adam T. Klein, ReNika Moore & Scott A. Moss, Employer Credit-History Checks and Criminal
Record Checks of Job Applicants for Hiring Decisions: The Illegality Under the Title VII Disparate Impact
Doctrine, at The 13th Annual Corporate Counsel Institute, in GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, 2009 WL 2432291, at *5 (Mar. 12–13, 2009).
159 Adam T. Klein, Outten & Golden LLP, Transcript of Testimony at the U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity
Comm’n, Employment Testing and Screening Meeting (May 16, 2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/meetings/archive/5-1516-07/transcript.html.
160 EVREN ESEN, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., SHRM WORKPLACE VIOLENCE SURVEY (2004),
available at http://www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings/Documents/Workplace%20Violence%20Survey.
pdf. This number is up from the 19% of employers who admitted to using credit checks in 1996. Id.
161 See RICHARD C. HOLLINGER & JASON L. DAVIS, UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA SECURITY RESEARCH
PROJECT, 2002 NATIONAL RETAIL SECURITY SURVEY FINAL REPORT 13 (2003), available at http://www.pitnet.
com/nrss_2002.pdf. In 2002, an academic study found that about 41% of retail employers use credit history as
a screening measure for new employee hiring. Id.
162 See Gallagher, supra note 51, at 1603.
156
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an individual’s control that may have led to her filing for bankruptcy.163 Third,
the practice does not take into account that there is no correlation between an
individual’s ability to manage her finances and the quality of her work in lowlevel positions.164 Fourth, the practice has a disparate impact on minorities that
may run afoul of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.165 Fifth, the practice is
unnecessarily punitive because it punishes individuals who have already been
penalized for incurring too much debt.
1. Credit Reports Are Ineffective Evaluative Tools Due to Inaccuracies
A consumer credit report is a vehicle that enables lenders to “pierce the fog
of uncertainty” presented by an unknown consumer.166 Some employers use
these reports in the hiring process and believe that a credit report provides
evidence that is reflective of employment practices. Without examining
whether an individual’s debt or bankruptcy record actually reveals information
about her competency and integrity, which will be explored later, it is worth
examining the reliability of credit reports.
a. Credit Reports Are Unreliable
Studies of the three major credit reporting agencies by the Consumer
Federation of America found discrepancies among what each of these agencies
reported on the same individuals.167 Distressing statistics reveal an
overwhelming number of credit reporting inaccuracies that call into question
the validity of using credit reports.168 When comparing the information from
163 ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS
MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 81, fig. 4.1 (2003).
164 Robert J. Nobile & Brian Murphy, Rethinking the Use of Credit Histories in the Hiring Process, 17
NO. 2 HR ADVISOR: LEGAL & PRACTICAL GUIDANCE ART 7, Mar.–Apr. 2011.
165 See Klein, Moore & Moss, supra note 158, at *2.
166 Elizabeth Doyle O’Brien, Minimizing the Risk of the Undeserved Scarlet Letter: An Urgent Call to
Amend § 1681e(b) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 1217, 1221 (2008).
167 See CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., NAT’L CREDIT REPORTING ASS’N, CREDIT SCORE ACCURACY AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMERS 16, 33 (2002), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/121702CFA_
NCRA_Credit_Score_Report_Final.pdf. Currently, the FTC is conducting an eleven-year study mandated by
the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 to evaluate the accuracy and completeness of consumer
reports. Congress will report the study in 2014. FED. TRADE. COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER §§ 318
AND 319 OF THE FAIR AND ACCURATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS ACT OF 2003, at 2 (2004), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/reports/facta/041209factarpt.pdf (quoting Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-59, 117 Stat 1952, 1999).
168 See Gallagher, supra note 51, at 1595. A founder and former CEO of an employment screening
company admitted, “[t]his is an industry that has delivered historically a very low quality product.” Desmond,
supra note 156, at 913 (quoting Tal Moise, a provider of background screenings).
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the three major credit reporting agencies, on average only 24% of the
information yielded on a single consumer is reconcilable among the credit
reports.169 Moreover, 25% of errors found among the credit reports were
significant enough to change a person’s credit score.170 This is not surprising
considering that credit reports are supplemented with four billion pieces of
information every month.171
While it is easy to blame inaccuracies on the overwhelming amount of new
information, many of the inconsistencies in credit reporting are due to the
credit reporting agencies’ carelessness.172 For example, a credit bureau
routinely collects data from courthouse public records, and it may in its course
of work find that a potential employee named Alex Lopez from Miami, Florida
has filed for bankruptcy. However, the credit bureau is careless in that it does
not adequately verify which of the many people living in Miami named Alex
Lopez filed for bankruptcy before putting this negative information in his
credit report.173 If an Alex Lopez who is not bankrupt wants to fix his credit
report, he can contact the credit bureau directly. However, because of the
“technical accuracy” defense, reporting agencies may not be culpable for errors
that cost Alex Lopez a job, good credit, and future employment.174
Under the “technical accuracy” standard, a credit reporting agency must not
“merely promise that its reports contain factually correct information” for the
technical accuracy standard to be met, but rather the reports must actually
contain factually correct information.175 Courts applying the technical accuracy
standard justify the application of this lesser standard by explaining that it
promotes cost effective credit reporting.176 But the technical accuracy standard
cannot be justified when the legislature’s intent is taken into consideration.
Senator Proxmire, who introduced the Fair Credit Reporting Bill on January
169

CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., supra note 167, at 25.
WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 52, at 13.
171 FED. TRADE COMM’N & BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT DISPUTE PROCESS 3 (2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/
fcradispute/P044808fcrasdisputeprocessreporttocongress.pdf.
172 See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE PIRGS, MISTAKES DO HAPPEN: A LOOK AT ERRORS IN
CONSUMER
CREDIT
REPORTS
7
(2004),
available
at
georgiapirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/MistakesDoHappen2004-1.pdf.
173 Id.
174 See Gallagher, supra note 51, at 1603.
175 Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1157 (11th Cir. 1991). Other courts have
argued that the legislative history mandates procedures that assure “maximum accuracy.” Koropoulos v. Credit
Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 37, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
176 Heupel v. Trans Union LLC, 193 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1240 (N.D. Ala. 2002).
170
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31, 1969, stated that “[p]erhaps the most serious problem in the credit
reporting industry is the problem of inaccurate or misleading information.”177
A technical accuracy standard hardly accomplishes what Senator Proxmire
intended when he introduced his bill.
Theoretically, if there is any false information in a consumer’s credit
report, the consumer is in the best position to remedy the error- the consumer is
likely to be the most knowledgeable person when it comes to activities that
may affect that individual’s credit report. Under § 1681 of the FCRA, if a
consumer contacts a credit reporting agency about any inaccuracies or
incompleteness found within the credit report, the agency must investigate the
disputed information free of charge or delete the controversial item.178
According to the Eleventh Circuit, proving that a credit reporting agency has
not followed reasonable procedures in repairing inaccuracies requires a
plaintiff to establish that: (1) the plaintiff’s credit report contains an
inaccuracy; (2) this inaccuracy is due to the credit reporting agency’s “failure
to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy”; (3)
the plaintiff was injured by this failure; and (4) the plaintiff’s injury was
caused by the credit reporting agency’s inclusion of the inaccuracy.179 The
Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act and the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act amended the FCRA in 1996 and 2003 to improve reporting
“maximum possible accuracy.”180
The 1996 and 2003 amendments, while a step in the right direction, have
done little to protect vulnerable job applicants. In Neal v. CSC Credit Services,
Inc., Neal, a consumer, sued CSC, a credit reporting agency, for an entry on
her credit report that stated that she was “included in bankruptcy.”181 She
discovered this misinformation after she was denied a position.182 The issue in
this case was whether CSC Credit Services violated the FCRA by including
this information.183 Neal claimed that CSC did not maintain reasonable

177 Jill Riepenhoff & Robert Wagner, Credit-reporting Agencies’ Failure to Address Damaging Errors
Plaguing Thousands of Americans Prompts Call for Swift Action, THE DISPATCH (MAY 6 2010), http://www.
dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/05/06/credit-scars.html.
178 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A) (2006).
179 Cahlin, 936 F.2d at 1156.
180 Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996); Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003).
181 Neal v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., No.8:02CV378, 2004 WL 628214, at *2 (D. Neb. 2004).
182 Id. at *1.
183 Id.
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procedures to avoid reporting prohibited information.184 However, the court
held that the information included in Neal’s credit report was “technically
accurate” and did not violate the FCRA.185
Neal’s father was the debtor who filed for bankruptcy, but because her
father’s name was on her car lease, her father’s bankruptcy filing was included
on her credit report.186 After the court was notified that the credit report
accurately reflected that a bankruptcy was the cause of the late car payments, a
point won by using the technical accuracy standard, Neal had the additional
burden of establishing that CSC had not taken reasonable steps to assure an
accurate reflection of who filed for bankruptcy.187 For someone who is trying
to find employment, it is a drain on valuable time and resources to pursue a
credit reporting agency over the three words of “included in bankruptcy” on a
piece of paper. But the combination of the prevalence of private employers
using credit reports to screen job applicants and the majority’s narrow
interpretation of § 525(b) breathe life into these three words. Without these
words, Neal and countless others like her will have their employment prospects
damaged for many years. In short, “if it is true that [a] poor credit history is the
‘Scarlet Letter’ of [twentieth] century America, then no American consumer
should have to wear that letter undeservedly” when applying for a job.188 The
American bankruptcy system is meant to protect against that sort of endless
stigma.
b. Credit Reports Are Difficult to Remedy
Even if an individual learns of an error on her credit report, this discovery
is in vain because credit reports are currently too difficult to remedy. We care
about remedying the reports because an adverse report can interfere with
gaining employment and there is nothing prohibiting private employers’ use of
the reports. There are no federal statutes directly or indirectly on point
enjoining employment discrimination on the basis of an individual’s credit
score or her refusal to consent to the procurement of her credit report for a
potential employer.189 For instance, an employer can reject a job applicant

184
185
186
187
188
189

Id. at *2.
Id. at *4
Id. at *1–2.
See id. at *4.
O’Brien, supra note 166, at 1244.
See Gallagher, supra note 51, at 1603.
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simply for refusing to authorize the distribution of her credit report.190 The
only mechanism that provides uniform protection to consumers is the FCRA
and it does not sufficiently protect consumers from inaccurate credit reporting
in the employment context.
Despite this glaring deficiency, the FCRA is meant to protect consumers
from abusive practices and infringements on their privacy.191 The FCRA
requires an employer to secure an individual’s authorization prior to obtaining
a copy of her credit report.192 The FCRA also requires employers to inform job
applicants if their credit report results in denial.193 This urges creditors to
combat inaccuracies in their credit reports.194 But the FCRA has proven
ineffectual in both protecting consumers who have filed for bankruptcy and in
empowering them to fix inaccuracies in their credit reports.195 A consumer
who learns of an inaccuracy in her credit report should take this error very
seriously because an adverse credit report can have an extremely harmful
impact on future employment.196 For example, in Neal,197 the inaccurate
inclusion of Neal’s father’s bankruptcy on her credit report led to her being
denied employment as a teller with financial institutions like the American
National Bank, First National Bank, and Strategic Air Command Federal
Credit Union.198

190 See generally Kelchner v. Sycamore Manor Health Ctr., 305 F. Supp. 2d 429, 437 (M.D. Pa. 2004),
aff’d, 135 F. App’x 499, 502 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that an employer has the right to terminate an employee
upon her refusal to authorize a credit check).
191 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a) (2006); Adams v. Berger Chevrolet, Inc., 2001 WL 533811, at *3 (W.D.
Mich. 2001).
192 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A).
193 Id.
194 See Elwin Griffith, The Quest for Fair Credit Reporting and Equal Credit Opportunity in Consumer
Transactions, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 37, 38–41 (1994).
195 None of the cases that address a consumer making an effort to overcome his credit mention the
individual’s attempt to employ FCRA mechanisms. See, e.g., Myers v. TooJay’s Mgmt. Corp., 640 F.3d 1278
(11th Cir. 2011); Burnett v. Stewart Title, Inc. (In re Burnett), 635 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2011); Rea v. Federated
Investors, 627 F.3d 937 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 116 (2011); Leary v. Warnaco, Inc., 251 B.R.
656, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Fiorani v. CACI, 192 B.R. 401 (E.D. Va. 1996); Pastore v. Medford Sav. Bank, 186
B.R. 553 (D. Mass. 1995); Stinson v. BB&T Inv. Servs. (In re Stinson), 285 B.R. 239 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2002);
Madison Madison Int’l of Ill., P.C. v. Matra S.A. (In re Madison Int’l of Ill., P.C.), 77 B.R. 678 (Bankr. E.D.
Wis. 1987).
196 Michael R. Guerrero, Disputing the Dispute Process: Questioning the Fairness of § 1681s-2(a)8 and
§ 1681j(a)(1)(A) of the Fair and Accurate Credit Reporting Act, 47 CAL. W. L. REV. 437, 437–38 (2011).
197 See supra Part III.A.1.a.
198 See Neal v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., No.8:02CV378, 2004 WL 628214, at *2 (D. Neb. 2004).
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The FCRA does provide some protection to consumers applying for jobs.199
Employers must furnish a rejected job applicant with a copy of his or her credit
report, including a written description of the specific information that was
detrimental to the job application.200 This is cold comfort when the hurdles for
correcting inaccuracies are prohibitively high.201 Credit reporting agencies do
not take inaccuracy claims seriously; they outsource credit report disputes to
foreign countries that spend too little time evaluating individual claims.202 In a
severe illustration of how taxing the process for remedying a credit report
inaccuracy can be, one man fruitlessly disputed the accuracy of his credit
report for over a year.203 The process exacerbated his depression, and he
ultimately committed suicide.204 In his suicide note, he commented on his
struggle with the credit reporting agencies.205
This is an extreme example, but it demonstrates how frustrating it is that
the FCRA lacks both adequate protection for job applicants and the means to
correct credit report inaccuracies. Taking the steps to obtain job applicants’
consent and providing incentives to rejected applicants to diligently pursue
greater accuracy is not a remedy for the fundamental problem with the FCRA.
The fundamental problem is that the FCRA was not created with the aim of
regulating the employment industry, nor does it successfully do so.206 With this
in mind the important question becomes: should employers rely on unreliable
credit reports for measuring job applicants’ financial responsibility? This
Comment posits that they should not for two reasons: (1) the FCRA was not
created to regulate the employment industry; and (2) credit reports have a
dubious connection to job proficiency.
199

See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §1681b(a) (2006); Gallagher, supra note 51, at 1602.
15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a).
200 Id. § 1681b(b)(3).
201 See Guerrero, supra note 196, at 438–39. It can also be expensive to remedy credit report inaccuracies,
since a consumer can only view his credit report free-of-charge once a year.
202 Credit reporting agencies outsource credit report disputes to third-party contractors in countries like
Costa Rica and the Philippines. Id. at 438. This is supported by the facts that credit reporting agencies process
a minimum of twenty-two claims per hour and it costs agencies about fifty cents per dispute to process. Id.
203 Chi Chi Wu, Automated Injustice: How a Mechanized Dispute System Frustrates Consumers Seeking
to Fix Errors in Their Credit Reports, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 139, 140 (2010).
204 Id. at 141.
205 Id. Captain John Harrison’s testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, housing, and Urban
Affairs provides an additional account of how trying to fix a credit report error destroyed a man’s life. The
Fair Credit Reporting Act and Issues Presented by Reauthorization of the Expiring Preemption Provisions:
Hearing Before the Senate S. Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 157–59 (2003)
(statement of Capt. John Harrison, U.S. Army (Ret.)).
206 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A) (2006) (indicating that the FCRA is void of any requirement adapting
consumer information to the employment context).
199
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2. Credit Reports Ignore External Factors
Another reason why credit reports are an unreliable mechanism for
measuring an individual’s financial responsibility is that the reports do not take
into account forces outside of the consumer’s control that affect her decision to
file for bankruptcy. Therefore, credit reports can be misleading. They give the
illusion of providing insight into a job candidate’s spending habits and level of
responsibility when, in reality, credit reports merely impart the “brute
facts . . . without the reasons” and do not reflect the true causes of
bankruptcy.207 The three main causes of bankruptcy that account for 87% of
filings are job loss, medical problems, and family break-up (divorce and
separation).208 None of these causes are reflected on an individual’s credit
report. Moreover, there is nothing inherently indicative of the “big three”
causes suggesting an individual’s irresponsibility or a propensity to steal.209
But instead of actually learning more about a job candidate, potential
employers only see numbers and vague words on a credit report that
incorrectly suggest that an individual is financially irresponsible.210 An
examination of the “big three” causes of bankruptcy will further call into
question employer reliance on credit reports to measure a job applicant’s
value.211 This examination will also strengthen the claim that § 525(b) should
be amended.
a. Job Problems
Job problems are the most prevalent cause of bankruptcy.212 Sixty-one
percent of households report that their financial difficulties were due to
problems with unsteady and inadequate incomes before they ever filed for

207 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy,
53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1425 (2001).
208 WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 163, at 81, fig. 4.1. Other reasons include bad investments, credit card
overspending, and natural disasters. Id.
209 Desmond, supra note 156, at 911–12.
210 Id. at 912.
211 The reason why the “big three” have not done more to transform the political debate is because these
findings “ha[ve] been largely eclipsed by the credit industry’s effort to convince Congress and the American
people that frivolous overconsumption and moral decline are the causes of the increased use of bankruptcy.”
Jean Braucher, The Two-Income Trap: Why Middle-Class Mothers & Fathers Are Going Broke, 21 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 193, 196 (2004) (reviewing WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 163).
212 TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE
CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 105 (2000).
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bankruptcy.213 Not surprisingly, the stability of the job market is a crucial
factor affecting an individual’s financial health.214 There has been an increase
in layoffs since the December 2007 downturn in the economy.215 According to
the Wall Street Journal, as of 2011, unemployment and underemployment was
at 16.7%.216 A two-income family is two and a half times more likely to
experience layoffs than a single-income family from a generation ago.217
Consequently, increases in bankruptcy filings are not only to be expected,
but also unavoidable even with the most prudent financial planning.218
Ironically, families that think they are wise to send both parents into the
workforce in order to “buffer them[selves] against the terrible wrenches of a
changing economy,” according to researchers, “have just made themselves
more vulnerable to those very wrenches.”219 This is because a growing number
of mothers in the workplace means that the family has lost the security of
having mothers enter the workplace only when the family is experiencing
financial difficulties.220 Moreover, having both parents in the workplace
doubles the likelihood that one or both of the breadwinner’s employment may
be terminated.221
Because a recession is an outside force that does not reflect an individual’s
value as an employee, penalizing individuals for not anticipating an unstable
economy is senseless. Further, it is a social injustice for employers to use this
lack of foresight as an indication of financial impropriety. Part of bankruptcy’s
framework was founded on the principle that “economic failures [were]
produced by economic forces no more controllable or predictable than that
visitation by a tornado.”222 Discriminating against job applicant Dorothy
213 See Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L.
REV. 67, 99–100 (2006).
214 See id.
215 The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts reported that over a twelve-month period bankruptcy
filings rose about 20%. Bankruptcy Statistics, Filings, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS tbl. F (2010). Since
the recession began in December 2007, 4.4 million people have lost their jobs. Peter S. Goodman & Jack
Healy, Job Losses Hint at Vast Remaking of Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/03/07/business/economy/07jobs.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
216 Dave Kansas, A World of Worries: Markets Fall, New Recession Feared, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2011.
217 WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 163, at 83.
218 See Porter & Thorne, supra note 213, at 99–100.
219 WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 163, at 84 (quoting ROSALIND C. BARNETT & CARYL RIVERS, SHE
WORKS/HE WORKS: HOW TWO-INCOME FAMILIES ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER-OFF 2, 5 (1996)).
220 Id. at 81–82.
221 Id.
222 Charles G. Hallinan, The Fresh Start Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an
Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 56 (1986).
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because her farmhouse in Kansas was blown away by a tornado, resulting in a
chain of events that ruined her credit, is illogical. So, too, would it be
unreasonable to discriminate against her bankrupt Auntie Em, who is now
seeking employment in Oz because a seven-year drought caused her crops to
turn to dust and resulted in her livestock starving to death.
b. Illness
Illness is another factor that contributes significantly to bankruptcy filings.
Illness precipitates about 30% of bankruptcy filings.223 President Barack
Obama addressed this issue in his 2009 State of the Union Address when he
said, “We must . . . address the crushing cost of health care. This is a cost that
now causes a bankruptcy in America every [thirty] seconds.”224 Two million
Americans who become ill each year must simultaneously file for
bankruptcy.225 These Americans are predominantly middle-class homeowners
who went to college and had stable jobs before they were diagnosed with the
illnesses that triggered their bankruptcies.226
Individuals who fall victim to the double disasters of illness and bankruptcy
are not reckless people who are more likely to be irresponsible employees.227
In fact, three-quarters of debtors who became bankrupt due to medical issues
had some form of health insurance and thought, like many Americans, that
they were responsibly planning for unforeseen illness.228 The reality is that
even those with premier health insurance can suffer staggering out-of-pocket
expenses.229 Predictably, individuals fare worse if they cannot afford durable
coverage or their employers do not provide high-quality health insurance.230
For example, many non-premier healthcare insurance plans only pay for visits
to primary care doctors, and will not pay for specialists or emergency hospital
visits.231
223 A Harvard study of 1,771 Americans in bankruptcy courts nationwide revealed that medical bills cause
fifty percent of bankruptcies. Elizabeth Warren, Op-Ed., Sick and Broke, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2005, at A23.
224 President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress,
2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 5 (Feb. 24, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
remarks-president-barack-obama-address-joint-session-congress.
225 Warren, supra note 223.
226 Id.
227 See id.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 See id. Health and Human Service Secretary Mike Levitt pioneered a healthcare program called the
Utah Medicaid Program that provides only bare bones coverage. Id.
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When an individual is faced with a serious illness, she may be too ill to
continue working and lose her job. Losing a job is not just financially
devastating but it often means losing health coverage.232 Medically bankrupt
individuals usually qualify for the right to continue their health coverage under
the Comprehensive Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), a
form of short-term medical coverage triggered by termination.233 But the
$1,000 monthly premium for qualifying individuals is often not feasible for
someone who has just lost her primary source of income.234
A fairly typical case demonstrates how a diagnosis of a serious illness can
devastate a family’s finances and send them straight into bankruptcy. Carl
Sorabella, an accountant, contacted his employer to see if he could modify his
work schedule after his wife was diagnosed with stage-four lung cancer.235
Sorabella had worked for his employer for fourteen years, but now wanted a
more flexible schedule so that he could increase his availability to take his wife
to chemotherapy and accompany her during medical testing.236 When
Sorabella first made his rescheduling request, his employer said that she would
have to fire him.237 In response, Sorabella promised to work nights and make
up any missed hours.238 His employer told him the following work week that
his employment would be terminated.239
Because his company employed fewer than fifty people, the company was
exempt from related federal laws and thus acted legally.240 As this case
demonstrates, Sorabella was not inherently a bad employee because his wife
developed cancer. In fact, Sorabella received a raise months before his position
was terminated.241 Due to the employer’s termination decision, Sorabella and
his wife were forced to live off of his unemployment and disability insurance
while they both struggled to find employment.242 This case demonstrates that
232

See id.
MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 491–92 (7th ed. 2011).
234 See Warren, supra note 223.
235 Susanna Kim, Massachusetts Man Fired After Telling Employer His Wife Has Cancer, ABC NEWS
(July 15, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/massachusetts-man-fired-revealing-wife-cancer/story?id=
13845661.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id. The Family and Medical Leave Act mandates twelve weeks of unpaid leave when an individual or
immediate family member is diagnosed with a serious health condition. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2006).
241 Id.
242 Id.
233
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good employees can be labeled as irresponsible due to unfortunate, extenuating
circumstances. Professor Deborah Thorne observes, “from the point of the
employer, it simply isn’t a wise business practice—many smart and qualified
folks are going to be overlooked just because of the economic downturn or
someone in their family had the misfortune of getting ill.”243
c. Family Break-up
Ninety percent of the individuals who file for bankruptcy not only are
educated, but also qualify as middle class.244 Further, most of these individuals
are part of a family in which both parents have entered into the workforce.245
Compared to single-income families a generation ago, these modern twoincome families are twice as likely to file for divorce.246 The sociological
reasons behind this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this Comment, but
exploring how divorce and separation lead to bankruptcy further demonstrates
that a bankruptcy history is not a relevant criterion for making hiring decisions.
It is conventional wisdom that members of a two-income family tend to
share expenses and other responsibilities of managing a household. When a
married couple separates, at least one of the adults often moves out of the
marital home and finds a new place to live while the remaining spouse is left to
shoulder the residual financial burden under the lease or mortgage the couple
co-signed.247 Single parents may find it impossible to pay for separate homes
with one income when they anticipated paying for one home with their joint
incomes. The family break-up and additional expenses leave the single parents
vulnerable to debt and bankruptcy.248 Simply because a couple decides it is in
their family’s best interest to get a divorce, a decision that may lead to a

243 Debb Thorne, Does a Tarnished Credit Report Equal an Untrustworthy Employee? CREDITSLIPS.ORG
(Aug. 14, 2009, 11:39 AM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2009/08/last-week-the-nyt-ran-a-piecedescribing-how-common-it-has-become-for-employers-to-run-credit-checks-on-folks-applying-for-j.html.
244 WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 163, at 7. Elizabeth Warren and her daughter, Amelia Warren Tyagi,
wrote a book that explores, among other topics, how and why divorce and separation is a leading cause of
bankruptcy. The Two Income-Trap: Why Middle-Class Mothers and Fathers are Going Broke dispels the myth
that it is predominantly lower-class spenders who are filing for bankruptcy. See generally id.
245 Id. at 7.
246 Id. at 86.
247 Evan Bedard, Mortgage Options While Goring Through a Divorce, LOANSAFE (July 20, 2010),
http://www.loansafe.org/mortgage-options-while-going-through-a-divorce.
248 F.H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, The Bankruptcy Puzzle, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 201–02, 205–06
(1998).
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bankruptcy, does not mean that this information is relevant in evaluating a job
application.249
3. Financial Responsibility is Irrelevant to Most Low-Level Positions
To justify an employer’s consideration of a credit report as a part of the
hiring process, there should be a nexus between the applicant’s personal
finances and the job for which the applicant is applying. This nexus
requirement would apply when an employer is considering an applicant’s
bankruptcy history. The job candidates who are most likely to be discriminated
against because of a bankruptcy are individuals applying for low-level
positions.250 It is these positions where credit history is unlikely to reveal any
relevant information.251 Wisconsin State Representative Kim Hixton explained
that an applicant’s credit report is irrelevant to the hiring of a “truck driver,
librarian or gym employee,” and thus, considering an applicant’s credit report
for these types of jobs “should be illegal.”252 If a job does not entail the
handling of cash or expensive assets, employers cannot justify using credit
reports as a hiring criterion.
This is demonstrated in a case reported by The New York Times. Kevin
Palmer had been living in a homeless shelter in Santa Ana, California after
filing for bankruptcy.253 He was granted an interview for a clerk job at a
property management company.254 The job entailed transcribing homeowner’s
complaints.255 The interview went well and Palmer was shown an available
desk and the people with whom he would be working.256 Palmer explained that
the job would earn him enough income to get himself back on his feet.257
Unfortunately, the company’s interest in hiring Palmer disappeared after it
checked his credit history.258 Because the connection between Palmer’s
personal finances and his ability to record telephone complaints is too tenuous

249

See Thorne, supra note 243.
Nobile & Murphy, supra note 164.
251 Id.
252 Christine Lagorio, States Propose Limiting Credit Checks by Employers, INC. (Mar. 1, 2010),
http://www.inc.com/news/articles/2010/03/credit-check-legislation.html.
253 Jonathan D. Glater, Another Hurdle for the Jobless: Credit Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2009.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Id.
250
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to merit an extensive credit check, legislation is needed to curb this
employment practice.
Representative Jon Switalski, a Democrat who proposed antidiscrimination legislation in Michigan, called cases such as Kevin Palmer’s
case discrimination. Switalski emphasized that “if you miss a few payments or
you have medical debt, your skills as a pipe fitter or an electrician don’t
diminish.”259 There are various factors such as job problems and illness where
there is not a causal connection between a job applicant’s bankruptcy history
and the job for which the applicant is applying.260 Continuing to treat negative
credit history caused by extraneous factors as a determinative appraisal of a job
applicant is misguided and injurious.
4. Screening Out Bankrupt Debtors: A Title VII Disparate Impact Issue
One of the primary reasons the use of bankruptcy history is injurious in the
employment context is because it may have a disparate impact on minorities.261
The disparate impact doctrine applies when an employment criterion is
“facially neutral” yet has the effect of disadvantaging certain minorities.262
There is reason to believe that private employers’ use of credit reports as a way
of screening out bankrupt debtors may have a disparate impact on protected
classes of minorities.263 Empirically, there is a correlation between adverse
credit information and an individual’s minority status.264
In general, certain classes of minorities are more likely to file for
bankruptcy.265 For example, African Americans are overrepresented in the
general population of individuals who file for bankruptcy.266 Hispanic
homeowners are nearly three times more likely to file for bankruptcy than
similarly situated white homeowners.267 A study in Missouri supported this
correlation “even after controlling for income, educational attainment, marital
status, urban residence, the unemployment rate, and other socioeconomic

259

Id.
WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 163, at 84.
261 See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993).
262 Id.
263 See Klein, Moore & Moss, supra note 158, at *2.
264 See Neal v. CSC Credit Services, Inc., No. 8:02CV378, 2004 WL 628214, at *2 (D. Neb. 2004); see
also Klein, Moore & Moss, supra note 158, at *2.
265 See Klein, Moore & Moss, supra note 158, at *2.
266 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK 494, 508 tbl. B (1994).
267 WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 163, at 159.
260

OROVITZ GALLEYS3

2013]

8/1/2013 2:53 PM

THE BANKRUPTCY SHADOW

587

factors.”268 In short, a private employer who uses a credit report as an
evaluative tool is not only discriminating against a job applicant because of her
bankruptcy status, but may also be violating Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act.269
In the landmark case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Supreme Court
explained that an employment practice with a disparate impact is lawful if and
only if it is based on “business necessity.”270 The Court further clarified that
“good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment
procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for
minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.”271 The Court
looked to congressional intent272 and held that an assessment is forbidden if it
measures a person in the abstract instead of measuring the person for a
particular job.273 The Court strongly considered Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, which is meant to protect racial minorities from employment assessments
that have a disparate impact on different groups.274 One such employment
assessment is a credit report.275
There are no studies to support the contention that individuals with adverse
credit reports are more likely to be irresponsible or dishonest employees. In
fact, one study found the connection between credit scores and job
performance is non-existent.276 Because no empirical evidence exists to
substantiate employers’ argument that adverse credit reports are indicative of
268 BRENT KABLER, STATE OF MO. DEP’T OF INS., INSURANCE-BASED CREDIT SCORES: IMPACT
MINORITY AND LOW INCOME POPULATIONS IN MISSOURI 11 (2004).
269 See Gallagher, supra note 51, at 1610.
270 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
271 Id. at 432.
272 The Griggs Court explained:

ON

The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute.
It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in
the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees. Under the Act,
practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be
maintained if they operate to “freeze” the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices.
Id. at 429–30.
273 Id. at 436.
274 Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006) (detailing the practices that create a disparate
impact).
275 See Employment Tests and Selection Procedures, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N
(Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/factemployment_procedures.html.
276 See Martha C. White, Employee with Bad Credit Scores Aren’t Less Ethical, TIME, Nov. 15, 2011,
http://business.time.com/2011/11/15/workers-with-bad-credit-arent-less-ethical/.
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poor job performance, the practice of using credit reports as an evaluative tool
raises red flags as to whether this practice runs afoul of Title VII. One credit
reporting agency, Equifax, has even discontinued furnishing credit reports to
employers seeking to use this information for employment purposes.277 Studies
and credit reporting agency behavior indicate that the presence or absence of
“filed for bankruptcy” on a credit report is not an appropriate criterion for
hiring decisions.278
The disparate impact of using credit reports as a screening tool is similar to
the impact of using criminal convictions as a screening tool.279 The Eighth
Circuit held that an employer’s refusal to hire individuals with any type of
criminal record had an adverse impact on minorities and thus violated Title
VII.280 This absolute bar shifts to the employer the burden of proving that the
applicant pool is not artificially restricted and that the policy is justifiable via
the “business necessity” exception.281 Employers have not been able to meet
that burden. Employers who use criminal records have been sued for negligent
hiring and the settlement figures average $1.6 million.282 Thus, a policy of
avoiding criteria that are unduly restrictive can be beneficial to the litigationadverse employer and job applicant alike.
The EEOC has taken the stance that an employer’s use of a consumer credit
report violates Title VII’s disparate impact provisions if the employer does not

277 John Ulzheimer, Equifax No Longer Selling Credit Reports for Employment Screening, CREDIT.COM,
Sept. 22, 2009, http://creditbuildersalliance.org/files/equifax_not_sell_reports_to_employers.pdf.
278 See BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 192
(1983).
279 See Gallagher, supra note 51, at 1599.
280 Green v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1198 (8th Cir. 1975). The Eighth Circuit wrote:

We cannot conceive of any business necessity that would automatically place every individual
convicted of an offense, except a minor traffic offense, in the permanent ranks of the
unemployed. This is particularly true for blacks who have suffered and still suffer from the
burdens of discrimination in our society. To deny job opportunities to these individuals because
of some conduct which may be remote in time or does not significantly bear upon the particular
job requirement is an unnecessarily harsh and unjust burden.
Id.
281

See EEOC Policy Statement on the Use of Statistics in Charges Involving the Exclusion of Individuals
with Conviction Records from Employment, EEOC.GOV, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/convict2.html (last
visited Feb. 26, 2012). See generally El v. Se. Penn. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2007).
282 See EEOC Policy Statement on the Use of Statistics in Charges Involving the Exclusion of Individuals
with Conviction Records from Employment, EEOC.GOV, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/convict2.html (last
visited Feb. 26, 2012).
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have a legitimate reason for relying on such a report.283 Acting chairman of the
EEOC Stuart J. Ishimaru has openly questioned whether credit reports are a
good screening device.284 In EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Education, the EEOC
asserted that an employer’s use of credit histories violates Title VII when it has
a disparate impact on certain protected classes.285 The EEOC reasoned that
racial minorities are more disadvantaged than their white counterparts because
racial minorities are more susceptible to predatory lending, foreclosures,
unemployment, and health care-related bankruptcies that negatively impact
credit history.286
The EEOC further alleges that credit history is “neither job-related nor
consistent with business necessity because there are more appropriate, less
discriminatory alternative selection procedures.”287 It is worth noting that
although the EEOC indicates in its decisions that credit checks by private
employers are troubling,288 its policies are not always given great deference by
courts.289 Of course, if the EEOC’s position stands up in court, Congress will
have to react accordingly. It is arguable whether there is a disparate impact
claim, but the adverse impact on minorities should prompt congressional
reform in this field.
B. Screening Out Job Applicants Who File for Bankruptcy is Unnecessarily
Punitive
Bankruptcy reform is needed to protect the sanctity of American
bankruptcy’s fresh start because it is unnecessarily punitive to condemn people
for their credit histories and prevent them from obtaining employment to
revitalize their credit.290 Bankruptcy reform advocates argue that a major
problem with the current system is that filing for bankruptcy no longer elicits
shame, a sort of psychological punishment spurred by societal judgment.291
283 Claims brought by the EEOC have been rejected by courts because of the statute of limitations
imposed on claims that are found to be discrete acts and not inherent of a hostile work environment. See, e.g.,
EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., 790 F. Supp. 2d 619, 625 (N.D. Ohio 2011).
284 See Glater, supra note 253.
285 Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., 790 F. Supp. 2d at 621.
286 Nobile & Murphy, supra note 164.
287 EEOC v. Freeman, No. RWT 09CV2573, 2010 WL 1728847, at *1 (D. Md. Apr. 27, 2010).
288 EEOC Decision No. 72-1176, 45 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 960 (1972); EEOC Decsion No. 74-2,
6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 830 (1973).
289 See El v. Se. Penn. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 244–45 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding the EEOC’s
guidelines unqualified for deference and instead adopting a different standard).
290 Nobile & Murphy, supra note 164, at 1.
291 Julie Kosterlitz, Over the Edge, 29 NAT’L J. 870, 871 (1997).
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Senator Chris Dodd has stated that the social stigma of bankruptcy has
vanished.292 Reform advocates further argue that because people no longer feel
ashamed when they file for bankruptcy, bankruptcy filings have increased over
the last decade.293 It cannot be argued that the social stigma of bankruptcy is
gone when employers use internal hiring policies that discriminate against
individuals who have filed for bankruptcy. Not only does it appear that the
stigma is alive and well, but job seekers are tormented by their bankruptcy
shadow warding any opportunity for a “fresh start.”294
Allowing employers to use credit report information as an evaluative tool
punishes bankrupt debtors who are just trying to get back on their feet. As
previously discussed, the “big three” reasons why people file for bankruptcy
are employment termination, serious illness, and family breakup.295 Punishing
individuals who have already fallen on hard times because of external factors
is unnecessarily punitive and morally repugnant. Moreover, this punishment
runs counter to the objective of debtor rehabilitation as envisioned by the fresh
start policy. Part of rehabilitation is discharging debt in the name of “renewed
economic vigor.”296 It is nonsensical that an individual discharging her
debilitating debt is doomed to acquire the debilitating bankruptcy shadow in its
place. A solution is necessary to stop the cycle of joblessness. The best way to
accomplish this is to limit employers’ access to bankruptcy information, which
is not only damaging to a job candidate’s application, but also does not provide
any legitimate insight into the candidate’s qualifications.297 To determine the
best means of doing so, it is essential to examine how state and federal
legislators are handling this issue.

292

Id.
Id.
294 See Ziad Raymond Azar, Bankruptcy Policy: A Review and Critique of Bankruptcy Statutes and
Practices in Fifty Countries Worldwide, 16 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 279, 289 (2008) (explaining that
bankruptcy practices around the world show signs of an enduring, international stigma of bankruptcy).
295 See supra Part III.A.2.a–.c.
296 Howard, supra note 24, at 1088.
297 Nobile & Murphy, supra note 164, at 2; Thorne, supra note 243.
293
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IV. STATE AND FEDERAL LEGISLATION IS BEING PROPOSED AND ENACTED TO
PREVENT THE DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICE OF USING CREDIT HISTORIES IN
EMPLOYMENT
A. State Legislation
The court system is not the appropriate arena to fix the problem of
employment discrimination against individuals who have filed for bankruptcy.
The protections provided by § 525(b) and the FCRA are too narrow to allow
courts to restrict private employer access to adverse credit reports. However,
the political response has been more successful in protecting job applicants
from employment discrimination.298 In recent years, state legislators have been
reacting to their unemployed constituents who have been discriminated against
because of their adverse credit reports.299 For example, Hawaii State
Representative Marcus Oshiro explained that the interplay between adverse
credit and unemployment is “almost like being forever sentenced to debtors’
prison.”300
Currently, seven states have enacted anti-credit-check legislation that either
bans or limits employers’ access to job applicants’ consumer credit reports.301
In the 2011 legislative session, twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia
either introduced or had pending anti-credit-check bills.302 An examination of
some of the enacted and pending legislation signals not only the gravity of the
situation, but also the need for uniform reform. To date, California,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Oregon, and Washington have
enacted legislation either banning or limiting private employers’ use of credit
report information in hiring.303 Washington was the first state to pass its
legislation into law on April 18, 2007.304 It was amended in 2011 to limit
employer access to credit reports unless the job applicant seeks to fill a
position that is associated with credit.305
298

Lagorio, supra note 252.
Id.
300 Thomas Frank, Job Credit Checks Called Unfair, USA TODAY, Feb. 13, 2009, at 1A.
301 Use of Credit Information in Employment 2011 Legislation, NCSL.ORG (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.
ncsl.org/issues-research/banking/use-of-credit-information-in-employment-2011-legis.aspx.
302 Id.
303 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt(b) (West 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.7(a)(8) (2012); 820 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 70/10(a)(1) (2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.320 (2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.020(2)
(2012); see also NCSL.ORG, supra note 301.
304 S.B. 5827.
305 H.B. 1733, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011).
299
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In this Subpart, this Comment will primarily analyze the Illinois bill, as this
legislation shows the strengths and weaknesses of state credit check statutes.
This Comment will examine Illinois’ Employee Credit Privacy Act (Illinois
Act) because it has been lauded as a nearly “ideal [credit check] legislation”
and its provisions have been used as a model for several states.306
The Illinois Act forbids employers from denying employment to an
individual because of his or her credit report.307 If a job applicant feels she has
been discriminated against because of her credit report, she can bring a civil
action to obtain damages, injunctive relief, or both.308 In addition, the Act
explicitly awards attorneys’ fees and reasonable costs to prevailing
plaintiffs.309 Under the statute, a credit check is lawful only if it is an
“established bona fide occupational requirement of a particular position or a
particular group of employees.”310 A practice is a “bona fide occupational
requirement” under the Illinois Act if one of the seven listed exceptions is
met.311 For the most part, these exceptions are narrow and leave little latitude
for varying interpretations.312 For example, the Illinois Act gives employers the
right to use credit reports when an individual applies for a position that entails
unsupervised access to cash or assets valued at $2,500 or more, access to
“financial information” or “trade secrets,” or “signatory power” over $100 or
more worth of assets per transaction.313
The exceptions listed in the Illinois Act are reasonable for political and
policy reasons. Without these exceptions, it is unlikely a bill of this nature
would ever get passed. Further, there are some jobs where an individual’s
credit may be a useful tool for determining her ability to perform a particular
task, such as when an employee has access to a substantial amount of business
assets or cash. Some commentators suggest that individuals with adverse credit
should not have access to sensitive information because they can trade this
information for money, but this reasoning is unsupported and is a “slippery

306 Employee Credit Privacy Act, H.B. 4658, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2010); see also
Sharon Goott Nissim, Stopping a Vicious Cycle: The Problems with Credit Checks in Employment and
Strategies to Limit Their Use, 18 GEO. J. POVERTY LAW & POL’Y 45, 73 (2010).
307 Employee Credit Privacy Act, H.B. 4658, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2010).
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Id.
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slope.”314 Under this rationale, individuals who have filed for bankruptcy
cannot be trusted around any business asset of monetary value, such as FedEx
parcels. There is no evidence that an employee who has filed for bankruptcy is
more likely to engage in theft than an employee who has never filed for
bankruptcy.315
The Illinois Act effectively avoids loopholes by listing specific
circumstances that must be met before an employer can access a job
applicant’s credit report. If the Act merely stated that an employer needs “an
established bona fide occupational requirement” without the listed
circumstances, there would be too much latitude for interpretation.316 Further,
in specifying a minimum dollar or value amount when a credit report is
acceptable, the bill establishes a clear standard.317 Also, the fifth exception
applies to any position where a job applicant has access to confidential or
financial information.318 This exception addresses one of the most prominent
employer arguments for using credit reports as a hiring criterion. Such an
exception imbues banks with the authority to deny individuals employment
who have filed for bankruptcy or who somehow indicate financial
irresponsibility.
One of the most troubling aspects of the bill is found in the fourth
exception: a satisfactory credit history is a bona fide occupational requirement
if “the position is a managerial position which involves setting the discretion or
control of the business.”319 This exception has the potential to be a virtually
unchecked loophole and could leave many job applicants vulnerable if courts
do not interpret it strictly. California’s bill also includes an exception for “a
managerial position.”320 Another problem with the Illinois Act is that it does
not include banks or financial institutions in its definition of employers.321
Banks and financial institutions are wholly exempt from discrimination
regulations against job applicants who at some juncture filed for bankruptcy.
This type of broad exception undercuts the purpose of the Act by permitting
entire industries to freely engage in employment discrimination.

314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321

Nissim, supra note 306, at 71.
See supra Part I.B.2.
H.B. 4658.
Id.
Id.
Id.
A.B. 22, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
H.B. 4658.
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The Washington and Hawaii bills also allow companies to freely engage in
employment discrimination.322 For example, the Washington bill gives
employers enormous latitude to conduct credit checks if they demonstrate that
doing so is “substantially job related.”323 This vague direction provides too
much leeway for judicial interpretation.
California’s bill is broader than the Illinois bill and has fewer exceptions.324
The only class of employer exempted from it is “certain financial
institutions.”325 The California bill does not exempt positions including
signatory power over business assets.326 The California bill was vetoed three
times by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger before it was passed.327 Governor
Schwarzenegger stated, “This measure would . . . significantly increase the
exposure for potential litigation over the use of credit checks.”328 A
substantially similar bill was approved by a vote of five to one on June 22,
2011.329
Currently, fifty-eight bills have either been proposed or are currently
pending in the 2011 legislative session to restrict a practice that is
“discriminatory and unnecessary.”330 Federal action is an alternative means to
solve the employment discrimination problem. It is preferable to state
legislation given that the different states will inevitably provide varying
standards. Therefore, compliance for national companies, for instance, would
be exceedingly difficult. Below, this Comment will argue that since
bankruptcy is a federal issue it requires a federal solution.
B. Proposed Federal Action: Equal Employment for All Act
The benefit of federal legislation is that certain states would never pass
state legislation prohibiting employment discrimination by private employers.
While employment decisions are usually local, regulation of credit checks in
the bankruptcy context should be federalized because bankruptcies are dealt
322

H.B. 31 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009); S.B. 5827, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2007).
S.B. 5827.
324 Nissim, supra note 306, at 74.
325 A.B. 22.
326 Id.
327 A.B. 482, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010); A.B. 943, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); A.B. 2918,
2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008).
328 California Governor Veto Message, Bill A.B. 943 (2009).
329 A.B. 22.
330 NCSL.ORG, supra note 306; Lagorio, supra note 252. The fifty-eight bills have been proposed by
twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia.
323
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with under federal law. Employment discrimination against debtors is already a
federal issue pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code.331 Arguably, private employers’
rights would be limited by more expansive federal bankruptcy legislation, but
consumer expectations and overall economic health are overriding factors that
must be considered. In this Subpart, this Comment will examine proposed
federal legislation that mirrors the Illinois Act. This Comment will discuss the
merits of the proposed legislations. Lastly, this Comment will appraise whether
this legislation is likely to pass and what initiatives are necessary to protect
debtors from employment discrimination.
Proposed federal legislation is similar to state laws in states like Illinois and
California.332 The Equal Employment for All Act (EEA Act) restricts when an
employer can use credit reports as a hiring tool.333 A private employer may use
a credit report when evaluating a job applicant if the job entails a “supervisory,
managerial, professional or executive position at a financial institution” or if
the job requires national security or FDIC clearance.334 Commentators praise
the exceptions in EEA Act for “strik[ing] an ideal balance between reducing
harmful effects of the credit check and maintaining financial security of
institutions.”335 This bill avoids overly broad assumptions about individuals
who have filed for bankruptcy while allowing certain employers to use this
information when appropriate.
The EEA Act strives to prevent employment discrimination by limiting
employers’ right to request job applicants’ consumer credit reports.336 The
impetus to pass the EEA Act came from the negative effect the economic crisis
has had on job applicants.337 These victims of the economic crisis are already
331

See 11 U.S.C. § 525 (2006).
See Equal Employment for All Act, H.R. 321, 112th Cong. (2011); A.B. 22; Employee Credit Privacy
Act, H.B. 4658, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2010).
333 H.R. 321.
334 Id.
335 Nissim, supra note 306, at 75. In July 2009 Representatives Steve Cohen and Luis Gutierrez cosponsored the EEA Act to address failings in the FCRA. Equal Employment for All Act, H.R. 3149, 111th
Cong. (2009).
336 Stephen Broderick, Congressmen Cohen and Guitierrez File Bill to Remove Financial Barriers to
Employment, WEBSITE OF CONGRESSMAN STEVE COHEN: 9TH DIST. TENN. (July 31, 2009), http://cohen.house.
gov/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=914&Itemid=25.
337 Id. The EEA Act has garnered support from thirty-seven members of Congress. H.R. 321: Equal
Employment for All Act, GOVTRACK.US (Feb. 4, 2012), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h112321. In addition, advocacy groups like the National Consumer Law Center, the U.S. Public Interest Research
Group, the NAACP, the Asian American Justice Center, and the National Employment Lawyers Association
are in favor of the EEA Act. Broderick, supra note 336. Advocacy groups are pushing for the EEA Act’s
passage because it would be integrated into the FCRA as a way to unambiguously protect job applicants. One
332
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feeling the hardships of financial instability. Having a bankruptcy shadow trail
them as they attempt to get back on their feet only compounds the problem.
While the bill was not passed into law during the 2009 to 2010 congressional
session, Representative Steve Cohen reintroduced the bill on January 19, 2011
in Congress’s current session.338 As of March 23, 2011, the EEA Act was
under the review of the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer
Credit.339 Because the EEA Act must pass through the House and Senate, it
will face scrutiny, which may weaken the bill if it is eventually passed.
The EEA Act states in pertinent part: “a prospective employer . . . may not
use a consumer report . . . or cause a consumer report . . . to be procured with
respect to any consumer where any information contained in the report bears
on the consumer’s creditworthiness, credit standing, or credit capacity for
employment purposes.”340 If the EEA Act becomes law, this limitation on
employers cannot be waived by a job applicant’s authorizing the procurement
of her consumer credit report.341 The EEA Act lists certain exceptions where
an employer can use a consumer report if an individual is applying for a highlevel position at a financial institution or is seeking employment with certain
government agencies.342 An excepted employer must still conform to other
sections of the FCRA mandating disclosure and notification when adverse
action is taken because of the information found within the report.343
Some commentators have criticized the EEA Act for including overly
narrow exceptions.344 Critics suggest that non-financial firms whose employees
manage money should be included in the list of exempt employers.345 This
would include retail stores or call centers where credit card information is
given over the telephone. Small businesses are major opponents of the EEA
Act. Small businesses claim that they are especially vulnerable to employee

commentator has argued that the EEA Act will also benefit society as a whole because disbursement of data
that misrepresents individuals is a social injustice. Desmond, supra note 156, at 924.
338 H.R. 3149: Equal Employment for All Act, GOVTRACK.US (Feb. 4, 2012), http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=H111-3149.
339 H.R. 321: Equal Employment for All Act, THOMAS.LOC.GOV, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
D?d112:1:./temp/~bdYQKF (last visited Feb. 4, 2012).
340 Equal Employment for All Act, H.R. 321, 112th Cong. (2011).
341 Id.
342 Id.
343 Id.
344 Liz Wolgemuth, Should Your Credit Report Cost You a Job?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 29,
2009.
345 Id.
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fraud.346 By not allowing adverse credit history as a bar to employment, small
businesses argue that they become more vulnerable to employee theft.347 Not
only small businesses, but also private employers, find the EEA Act, at least in
its proposed form, problematic. Employers also argue that there is a correlation
between how an individual manages her own finances and her ability to
manage the finances of her employer, and thus the potential employer should
have access to such information.348 This Comment has shown this argument is
unsupported.349
To pass the EEA Act, pioneers of this reform will have to overcome
misconceptions about the causes of bankruptcy and the relevance of a
bankruptcy filing to job qualifications. Public awareness is paramount to
triumph over the bankruptcy shadow. The vicious cycle of bankruptcy can only
be stopped when credit reports are used in a way that reflects the value of the
information they provide. As it stands, credit reports have been used, and
continued to be used, by private employers for an unintended purpose. It is
time to pierce the veil of the credit report’s perceived, yet unsubstantiated,
value to private employers and amend § 525(b).
CONCLUSION
In Greek mythology, Sisyphus is punished for eternity to carry a boulder to
the top of a mountain only to watch it roll back down and start this task
again.350 The Gods chose this fate for Sisyphus because “they had thought with
some reason that there is no more dreadful punishment than futile and hopeless
labor.”351 Job seekers who have gone through bankruptcy are punished
similarly. They struggle to apply for jobs with the promise of a “fresh start,”
but like Sisyphus, they realize their efforts are futile and have no choice but to
repeat this struggle.
Private employers, who are increasingly using credit reports to disqualify
job applicants who have filed for bankruptcy, precipitate a problem that must
be addressed. While passage of the EEA Act would ensure that individuals

346

Id.
Id.
348 Id.
349 See supra Part III.A.2.a–.c.
350 ALBERT CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS (1942), reprinted in THE MYTH
ESSAYS BY ALBERT CAMUS 119 (Justin O’Brien trans. 1969).
351 Id.
347

OF

SISYPHUS

AND

OTHER

OROVITZ GALLEYS3

598

8/1/2013 2:53 PM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 29

filing for bankruptcy are not victims of employment discrimination,352 the EEA
Act was buried during the last congressional session, and it is likely that
Congress will continue doing so in perpetuity. Individual state laws are a
temporary solution, but most of the states’ enacted laws provide too much
latitude for interpretation. This leaves the jobless in the same precarious
situation they were in before the state law was passed. The jobless are
repeatedly punished and must continue to fruitlessly apply themselves when
there is only a slight chance of succeeding.
Reforming § 525(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, as one commentator has
proposed, is the most practical means of protecting job seekers who have filed
for bankruptcy.353 Section 525(b) should be amended so that individuals
applying for private sector positions are treated the same as those applying for
government jobs. This would require adding a mere three words to 11 U.S.C.
§ 525(b).354 The revised subsection should read:
No private employer may terminate the employment of, deny
employment to, or discriminate with respect to employment against
an individual who is or has been a debtor under this title, a debtor or
bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act, or an individual associated with
such debtor or bankrupt, solely because such debtor or bankrupt . . . .

This reform will undoubtedly lead to treatment of debtors that upholds the
fresh start theory. If bankrupt debtors are better protected by the language of
the Bankruptcy Code, employers will demand that the credit reporting agencies
furnish “clean” bankruptcy reports. Credit reporting agencies will have to
redact bankruptcy information from credit reports to prevent employers from
being tarred with bankruptcy litigation claims. Employers and credit reporting
agencies working together to comply with the amended § 525(b) is a natural
cycle of responses that will hopefully ameliorate the fresh start problem.
Resolution of this issue is crucial for another reason. Employers’ use of
credit histories as an evaluative tool has caused a spike in litigation and
arbitration.355 This is because of the fact that as employees are becoming
increasingly vulnerable, disgruntled job seekers have nothing to lose by suing
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employers who they feel have treated them unfairly. While this area of law is
in flux, employers should be cautious and take steps to avoid liability. If an
employer feels that obtaining a credit report is necessary to evaluate a
particular job applicant, she should be certain that she can demonstrate a strong
correlation between the applicant’s credit history and the job.356 Employers
that are financial institutions or that are trying to fill positions that entail access
to large amounts of cash have stood up in court.357 The EEOC suggests that
private employers avoid using credit history as a hiring criteria altogether, as
this practice exposes the employer to liability under the disparate impact
doctrine.358 This is especially true if an employer is denying an applicant based
solely on her bankruptcy status.359
One commentator suggests an alternative solution to the three-word
addition to § 525(b) of “deny employment to.”360 She proposes that Congress
change the bankruptcy discrimination test from one that relies on the “sole
cause” to a “motivating factor” test.361 This proposal does not go far enough.
The main reason to amend § 525(b) is to prevent employment discrimination
against bankrupt debtors and provide a fresh start to debtors applying for
private sector jobs. This would mirror the protection provided to bankrupt
debtors applying for public sector jobs. The “motivating factor” test does not
safeguard job applicants applying for private sector jobs. Instead, it offers
another vague test that requires further case law to clarify what falls within the
definition of a “motivating factor.” Moreover, augmenting the bankruptcy
discrimination test entails not only an examination of § 525(b), but also an
understanding of § 525(a). It is a significantly more complicated initiative to
amend the entire statute, rather than supplement subsection (b) with three
words. Further, the recommended remedial provisions are merely a Band-Aid
for a problem that is comparable to a festering wound. The only solution for
the bankrupt debtor is for Congress to amend § 525(b) to mirror § 525(a).
Although public awareness and support from influential administrative
agencies like the EEOC are critical to reform § 525(b), the most powerful
356
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influence for preventing employment discrimination against bankrupt debtors
is the courts. Looking at the history of how § 525 came into being and how
Congress showed a willingness to codify Perez, we can see that the courts have
the power to influence change through their opinions.362 While it is
understandable for a judge to want to adhere to the letter of the law, it is also
admirable for the judge to issue an opinion that addresses the harmful effects
of § 525(b). Hopefully, the culmination of supportive judicial opinions, along
with public and administrative pressure, may be enough to vanquish the
bankruptcy shadow.
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